M K Alam , Dhaka — The Government of Bangladesh is finalizing preparations to integrate the comprehensive database and biometric profiles of 1.2 million forcibly displaced Rohingya refugees into a dedicated state server.
Developed by the Bangladesh Computer Council (BCC), the infrastructure is scheduled for imminent handover to the Ministry of Home Affairs, marking a decisive step toward preventing refugees from illicitly acquiring Bangladeshi National Identity (NID) cards and passports.
Once the system becomes fully operational, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will begin transferring the data directly to the newly established Bangladeshi server. Previously, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) only possessed restricted, “read-only” access to this registry.
Confronting Data Security Concerns
The data transfer follows years of diplomatic negotiations. While international agencies previously withheld the database citing stringent personal privacy and data protection concerns, the current interim administration accelerated discussions across multiple state forums.
The Bangladeshi government successfully argued its sovereign right to host and protect data generated within its territory, assuring international partners that advanced infrastructure would guarantee data privacy.
“UNHCR has finally agreed to hand over the database, which they had withheld for years over data privacy concerns,” confirmed Mohammad Mizanur Rahman, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner. “A specialized committee has been formed to oversee secure data storage under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs.”
Advanced Biometrics to Detect Fraud
The integration aims to systematically eliminate identity theft. Currently, syndicated networks involving corrupt local representatives, passport office staff, and middlemen help refugees illegally secure Bangladeshi citizenship documents.
To combat this, the NID authority recently issued a directive to the RRRC Director General to implement an Application Programming Interface (API) link. This protocol will bridge the Rohingya database with the national NID central server.
Once connected, any attempt by a refugee to apply for a Bangladeshi NID will trigger an automatic biometric mismatch, locking out the applicant via fingerprint and iris recognition software.
The urgency of this system was highlighted by a recent intelligence report identifying 171 Rohingya refugees who successfully procured fraudulent Bangladeshi passports under assumed identities—such as “Salman Ahmed” and “Marjan”—using fake parental names and addresses across Chattogram, Comilla, Feni, and Noakhali. Legal procedures are underway to revoke these documents.
Transition to Trackable, Legal Mobile SIM Cards
The database integration will also revolutionize telecommunications management inside the overcrowded camps of Cox’s Bazar.
Despite official prohibitions, an estimated 500,000 refugees currently utilize unauthorized Bangladeshi SIM cards, while others rely on Myanmar-based networks, complicating law enforcement efforts against cross-border drug trafficking and illicit mobile financial laundering.
Following a successful 2025 pilot program that issued 10,000 legal SIM cards, the government plans a sweeping crackdown to deactivate all illegal connections once the server goes live.
Subsequently, mobile operators regulated by the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) will issue official, trackable SIM cards to refugees aged 18 and above. These will be bound directly to their UNHCR-issued registration numbers, commonly referred to as “Progress IDs.”
“Deactivating illegal SIMs will significantly enhance our technological surveillance capabilities,” Commissioner Rahman noted. “This strategy is critical to curbing criminal syndicates, intercepting drug smuggling, and maintaining security inside the refugee camps.”